The anchoring theory of lightness perception (Gilchrist et al., Psychological Review 106 (1999) 795-834) has been described as one of the most successful approaches to lightness perception. Yet, not only does the original proposal contain serious gaps and inconsistencies, later expressions of the theory, which was never formally revised, seem to contradict the original claims while leaving the gaps unresolved. These problems call into question the theory's viability.
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How does the visual system decide whether to label a particular surface light, medium, or dark? The surface's luminance -the amount of light it is reflecting to the eye -is not a sufficient guide. True, a light surface reflects a high proportion of the light falling on it, a darker surface a smaller proportion. This characteristic proportion of light reflected by a particular surface, called its reflectance, and is what is expressed in the percept as lightness. But a high reflectance (e.g. a white) surface in low light may have the same or lower luminance than a low reflectance (e.g. a black) surface in bright light. So ranking surfaces on the basis of their luminance will not necessarily produce a correct estimate of their reflectance/lightness. We must first factor out illumination. But, like reflectance, illumination can only be ascertained on the basis of surfaces' luminance. This being the case, the only way to estimate relative reflectance is to first segregate surfaces lying within an area of common illumination, and then to rank them on the basis of their luminance. Now, relative reflectance will closely parallel relative luminance. The question then becomes, how does the visual system achieve this useful, lightness constancy-enabling segregation, and how does it assign specific, rather than relative, lightness values to surfaces?
The ''anchoring theory of lightness perception,'' introduced by Gilchrist et al. (1999) , proposed to answer the former question in a novel way. (Though the name of the theory refers to the latter question, the main feature of the solution adopted by Gilchrist et al. (1999) -the idea that relative rankings are anchored to a ''highest luminance equals white'' rule, did not originate with it, having been previously endorsed by other investigators, e.g. Land and McCann (1971) and Wallach (1976) .) The novelty stemmed from their assumption that the classic simultaneous contrast illusion, in which equiluminant gray squares, one on a white and the other on a black background, appear slightly different in lightness, is a direct result of the same mechanism underlying lightness constancy. The same mechanism, that is, that allows us to see two equiluminant surfaces as differing in lightness when one is lying in low and the other in high illumination was assumed to be responsible for simultaneous lightness contrast. The problem with this view, of course, is that the squares in the simultaneous contrast illusion do not appear to differ in their illumination. Thus, Gilchrist et al. (1999) adopt the position that, in estimating lightness, the visual system does not exploit its ability to do what the authors admit it is capable of doing and ''makes good intuitive sense'' (p. 804) -that is, to segregate areas on the basis of illumination boundaries. Instead, they propose that virtually any and all grouping principles, not just those correlated with uniform illumination, are employed by the visual system to guide the process of lightness estimation. Allowing theorists to ''bypass the problem of edge classification'' (p. 805) is listed as one of the theory's main strengths.
The specific claims of Gilchrist et al. (1999) are difficult to synopsize as they are not particularly coherent. Labelling segregated areas ''frameworks,'' they initially state that they ''propose to define a framework in terms of gestalt grouping principles'' and that ''a framework is a group of surfaces that belong together, more or less'' (p. 804). These frameworks may be adjacent, nested, or intersecting. A page later, the authors suggest that ''the strongest [grouping] factor is probably coplanarity.'' (p. 805) This is followed by the classic gestalt grouping factors, then by edge sharpness, T-junctions, Xjunctions, and, most weakly, retinal proximity. Adjacent luminances divided by a sharp edge are said to ''belong together strongly' ' (p. 805) 
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Vision Research j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / v i s r e s by a luminance ramp. The grouping factors are said to be ''graded, as opposed to all or none'' (p. 805) but no guidance is given as to the nature of this grading. A framework is said to be stronger or weaker depending on whether it is supported by a single or several grouping factors. Also, the strength of a framework is said to depend strongly on the number of distinct patches within it, and by its size.
The lack of clarity as to how ''frameworks'' are determined and grouping factors are supposed to be graded gave the theory a superficial (and scientifically inappropriate) advantage in that it allowed theorists to tailor explanations to selected cases. Gilchrist et al. (1999) themselves admit that their key concepts of ''belongingness, framework, and strength of framework obviously require greater clarification'' (829). Despite this flexibility, they cannot avoid presenting cases both of ''success'' and ''failure'' of the theory. For example, though they ''explain'' the original version of the Gelb staircase, they cannot explain the version bounded by a white surround. The theory is also silent on the issue of transparency effects, even though, as Kingdom (2008) has noted, transparencies ''behave similarly to light'' (p. 2091). By normal scientific standards, then, the anchoring theory would seem to have failed even as it was being born, or at least to have been born prematurely.
Fifteen years later, the basic concepts have still not been clarified, the theory continues to fail regularly, and the problem of transparency has still not been addressed. The theory, in other words, has not become more viable. If anything, it has become more obviously unviable, given that the claims of it supporters have changed to the point where they constitute reversals of the original proposal at both a conceptual and an experimental level. The theory, however, was never formally revised, and the altered claims are consistently represented as though they derive from the original theory. That this is possible implies either a tolerance for contradiction or that the theory does not contain falsifiable principles and therefore lacks heuristic value. Below, I offer some examples of the more striking contradictions discernible within the original version and between it and later claims.
Anchoring theorists' explanation of simultaneous contrast violates their assumptions
As Economou, Zdravković , and Gilchrist (2007) remind us, according to anchoring theory the simultaneous contrast illusion ''stems from local anchoring'' (p. 3). The local groups are said to be each gray target square and its black or white background. The target's lightness is assessed relative to its local background, and this estimate is then modified on the basis of its relationship to remainder of the display. This description is a problem, because nothing in the anchoring theory would seem to justify these groupings.
It seems fairly clear that anchoring theorists agree that the gray squares appear to lie on top of their backgrounds, but I will argue both this case as well as the possibility that they appear coplanar with their backgrounds.
If the gray targets are taken to have a figure-ground relationship with their backgrounds, then the only grouping factor that would seem to link them would be retinal proximity, the weakest of the lot. In contrast, the two gray squares appear to lie on the same level. According to Zdravković , Economou, & Gilchrist (2012) , non-adjacent surfaces that appear to lie under the same illumination level are grouped together fairly strongly (the separation between the surfaces in that study was 45 cm, much greater than that between the targets in the typical contrast display). The two backgrounds, which appear adjacent as well as coplanar, should be most strongly grouped according to Zdravković , Economou, and Gilchrist (2012) who state that ''two surfaces that are coplanar, adjacent and share a sharp boundary are maximally grouped for illumination'' (p. 783). In other words, the two most cohesive ''local frameworks'' would seem to be the two targets grouping together and the two backgrounds grouping together. Zdravkovic, Economou and Gilchrist (2012) also assert that occlusion (i.e. figure-ground) boundaries are strong segregating factors in anchoring theory. That said, it is hard to see how, on anchoring theory's terms, ''the illusion is mainly attributed to a strong lightening of the target on black due to its position as highest luminance in the local framework'' (Economou, Zdravković , & Gilchrist, 2007) .
If, on the other hand, the gray targets are taken as coplanar with their backgrounds, then according to anchoring theory, the whole display should constitute a single framework. This is also consistent with the stimuli used by Zdravković , Economou, and Gilchrist (2012) , in which parts of surfaces described as coplanar appear to overlap as figure and ground.
Figure and ground
Anchoring theory has generally ignored or downplayed the issue of figure-ground relations. In his disc-annulus experiments, Wallach (1948) , had revealed an asymmetry between disc and annulus in the application of the highest-luminance-white rule. As Gilchrist et al. (1999) observed, these stimuli ''lend themselves readily to a figure-ground analysis'' (p. 801). However, they argue that the figure-ground structure of the stimuli is actually not the operative factor, but is confounded with area: ''What had appeared to be a matter of figure-ground turns out to be a matter of relative area'' (p. 801).
Subsequently, however, Economou, Zdravković , and Gilchrist (2007) confirm the existence of a figure-ground asymmetry in contrast effects. They propose a ''supplement'' to the anchoring theory to accommodate these findings, stating that ''it may be that figure belongs to ground more than ground belongs to figure'' (p. 10). This is clearly not an explanation so much a somewhat mystical rephrasing of the facts. It does not address the apparent conflict between these investigators' claims and Gilchrist et al.'s (1999) rejection of the figure-ground relationship as a modulating factor in lightness perception in favor of an ''area rule.''
The ''critical test'' and the role of transparency
An unpublished experiment by Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist (1995) is described by Gilchrist et al. (1999) as ''a critical test'' of the anchoring theory. Here, the presence of a visible penumbra bisecting a set of coplanar surfaces seems only weakly to inhibit the application of the highest-luminance-white rule to the entire coplanar group. As a result, the experiment (as well as a similar one by Annan et al. (1997) ) appears to produce striking failures of lightness constancy. This finding was paradoxical in that it begged the question of how a visual system that apparently ignores obvious illumination boundaries can routinely succeed in achieving lightness constancy, but Gilchrist et al. (1999) apparently viewed it as critical proof of the irrelevance of edge classification.
The results and interpretation of these experiments are contradicted by those of Radonjić and Gilchrist (2013) . They perform a similar experiment, achieve the opposite result, and reach the opposite conclusion. (As Blakeslee, Reetz, and McCourt (2008) have pointed out, the results of Annan et al. (1997) reported in Gilchrist et al. (1999) and Gilchrist (2006) similarly contradict earlier edgesubstitution experiments (e.g. Gilchrist, Delman, and Jacobsen (1983) ), where a visible illumination edge was shown to segregate regions and produce lightness-constancy-type effects.) Radonjić and Gilchrist (2013) conclude that lightness computations are limited to ''the target's most immediate framework defined by a penumbra'' (p. 452) and, more generally, that a target's lightness ''depends on the highest luminance in its field of illumination, not the highest luminance in its plane'' (p. 451). Similar conclusions were reached by Gilchrist and Radonjić (2010) for pictorial scenes. Both studies contradict the position of Gilchrist (2006) , who continues to maintain that ''frameworks'' are not limited to regions of common illumination and that, in the case of pictures, penumbras have only a weakly segregating effect. (It is not clear why Gilchrist (2006) would have made such an assertion, since constancy effects clearly arise in the context of pictorial penumbras.) Oddly, while Gilchrist (2006) does acknowledge a strong segregating role for penumbras, he continues to refer to Annan et al. (1997) as a successfully-passed test of the anchoring theory.
Despite contradicting the ''critical test'' and its corollary, both Radonjić and Gilchrist (2013) and Gilchrist and Radonjić (2010) seem to represent their findings as straightforwardly consistent with the ''anchoring theory.'' Characteristically, Radonjić and Gilchrist (2013) state that: ''Anchoring theory explicitly specifies units in the image within which target lightness is determined by identifying factors that segregate frameworks (mainly depth and shadow boundaries)'' (p. 450). Earlier, Economou, Zdravković , and Gilchrist (2007) had made clear that the process involves edge classification: ''Luminance gradients, such as penumbrae, serve to segregate frameworks (suggesting an illumination boundary) within the anchoring model'' (p. 12) and that anchoring theory ''accommodates the important distinction between reflectance and illumination edges'' (p. 12). Clearly, the theory these authors are describing is not a theory that ''bypasses edge classification,'' but, rather, one that embraces it. If depth and shadow boundaries are now held to be the main segregating factors in anchoring theory, then we must ask how anchoring theorists reconcile their observations with those of the Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist (1995) and Annan et al. (1997) .
We should note that, in each case, the anchoring explanation involves adjusting the relative ''strengths'' of coplanarity and penumbra as grouping/segregating forces. That opposite results can both be rationalized as consistent with the anchoring theory reveals its lack of falsifiability/heuristic value.
An anchoring-theory-incompatible transparency explanation arguably explains Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist (1995) . In Arroyo, Annan, and Gilchrist (1995) , an actually gray surface on the bright side of a penumbra appeared only slightly less white than an actually white surface on the shadow side. These results seemed to indicate that luminance values were compared and ranked across the penumbra, in contrast to the more recent acknowledgement by anchoring theorists of a strong segregating role for penumbras. However, (presumably for reasons of methodological convenience), the bright side of the group of surfaces in these experiments contained no surface lighter than middle gray. Consequently, the contrast ratios on that side of the penumbra were lower than those on the shadow side. As noted by Anderson and Winawer (2005) the visual system has a bias to treat large reductions in contrast along an edge as indicating the presence of a transparent overlay (p. 5). More specifically, ''the lower contrast side of the edge is likely to be a transparency with a reflective component'' (Kingdom, 2008 (Kingdom, , p. 2091 . If the lower contrast ratios of surfaces on the bright side were interpreted as being due to a grayish overlay they would, arguably, be perceived as lighter than their luminances would otherwise dictate, the overlay being perceptually ''stripped away.'' The explanation of Gilchrist et al.'s (1999) ''critical test'' may, in other words, require conceptual tools that the current version lacks and gives no indication of developing.
Similarly, a stimulus described by Allred et al. (2012) as consistent with the anchoring theory is actually not consistent with any of the anchoring theory's claims to date, but is consistent with known principles of transparency. Specifically, these authors employ a set of coplanar surfaces arranged in the form of a checkerboard, sections of which appear, by design, to be more or less brightly illuminated. The authors describe these stimuli as producing effects of the magnitude of lightness constancy and invoke the anchoring theory as a conceptual framework. But the anchoring theory does not currently account for apparent illumination boundaries between coplanar surfaces in the absence of a penumbra, (and absent ratio-invariant X-junctions). The only apparent cue underlying these effects are the reduced contrast ratios in the relevant parts of the checkerboard, which are consistent with the presence of transparent overlays or with very bright or very low illumination (resulting in ceiling effects). At best, anchoring theorists could appeal to the grouping principle of similarity, but this would not justify the magnitude of the effects. Thus, Allred et al.'s (2012) stimulus constitutes another failure for the anchoring theory as presently represented.
4. Gilchrist (2006) , simultaneous contrast, and reverse contrast As discussed above, it was the classic simultaneous contrast illusion that led Gilchrist et al. (1999) to attempt to bypass edge classification and in favor of other grouping principles. The subsequent adoption of edge classification as a core principle has apparently altered anchoring theory's view of this illusion. Gilchrist (2014) seems to be describing the classic simultaneous contrast illusion as an error of edge classification when he states: ''The white and black backgrounds in simultaneous contrast have perimeters of constant, continuous sign, much like spotlights and shadows' ' (p. 18) . This description, of course, applies to the area of any homogeneous surface, not only to spotlights and shadows, and thus seems to be confounding reflectance and illumination boundaries. The fact is that some sharp boundaries produce the kind of segregation that leads to constancy effects, some to contrast effects, and some to neither. It is not clear on what theoretical basis Gilchrist (2006) is claiming that the borders of the black and white surfaces in this particular case are classified as illumination boundaries. The percept does not support this claim. Furthermore, why does this (supposed) edge-classification error not produce a constancy effect, but rather an effect six times weaker?
Perhaps the visual system is hedging its bets. If, however, contrast illusions are now to be considered by-products of inexplicable and selective edge-classification errors, then Gilchrist's (2014) anchoring account of ''reverse-contrast illusions'' (or assimilation effects) seems untenable. These are explained on the basis of the grouping (for the purpose of lightness estimation) of non-contiguous areas via Gestalt grouping principles such as continuity. It does not seem sensible to argue that the visual system is treating collections of non-contiguous surfaces -but not the areas between them -as lying under a common illumination.
Originality
Anchoring theorists have not been conscientious in keeping track of their own claims and assumptions, and they have also been careless in asserting ownership of ideas. If they are now asserting that according to the anchoring theory, ''the retinal image is segmented into frameworks based on two main factors: fuzzy boundaries and depth boundaries (corners and occlusion boundaries)'' (Zdravković , Economou, & Gilchrist, 2012, p. 782 ) then the claim is indistinguishable from the view attributed by Gilchrist (2014) to Kardos (1934) : ''According to Kardos (1934) the main factors in segmentation are depth boundaries (corners and occlusion boundaries) and penumbras'' (p. 18). Gilchrist's (2014) claim that the background squares in the classic simultaneous contrast illusion resemble spotlights or shadows parallels the view of Helmholtz that ''simultaneous contrast [is] in most instances a deception of judgment, whereby observers judge[] the color of a region as if it was covered by a veiling illumination the color of its surround'' (Kingdom, 1997, p. 674) . It is not apparent that anchoring theory has added a higher level of conceptual cohesion to these individual claims.
Conclusion
The anchoring theory is demonstrably a label that has been applied to claims that are vague, shifting, contradictory and conceptually incoherent, beginning with the original proposal and continuing throughout the theory's 15-year lifespan. Yet, it has recently been referred to as one of ''the most successful approaches to lightness perception'' (Murray, 2013) as ''a useful computational tool'' and the ''conventional explanation'' (Vladusich, 2013 p. 2) for the staircase Gelb effect (2013). It has spawned at least one variant (Bressan, 2006) and continues to be invoked as a guiding concept in contemporary literature (e.g. Lee & Brainard, 2014) . It is probably time to reassess its usefulness.
